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Published online: 05 December 2015Abstract. In the ﬁeld of severe accident, the description of corium progression events is mainly carried out by
using integral calculation codes. However, these tools are usually based on bounding assumptions because of high
complexity of phenomena. The limitations associated with bounding situations ([J.M. Seiler, B. Tourniaire,
A phenomenological analysis of melt progression in the lower head of a pressurized water reactor, Nucl. Eng. Des.
268, 87 (2014)] e.g. steady state situations and instantaneous whole core relocation in the lower head) led CEA to
develop an alternative approach in order to improve the phenomenological description of melt progression. The
methodology used to describe the corium progression was designed to cover the accidental situations from the
core meltdown to the molten core concrete interaction. This phenomenological approach is based on available
data (including learnings from TMI2), on physical models and knowledge about the corium behavior. It provides
emerging trends and best estimated intermediate situations. As different phenomena are unknown, but strongly
coupled, uncertainties at large scale for the reactor application must be taken into account. Furthermore, the
analysis is complicated by the fact that these conﬁgurations are most probably three dimensional, all the more so
because 3D effects are expected to have signiﬁcant consequences for the corium progression and the resulting
vessel failure. Such an analysis of the in-vessel melt progression was carried out for the Unit 1 of the Fukushima
Dai-ichi nuclear power plant. The core uncovering kinetics governs the core degradation and impacts the
appearance of the ﬁrst molten corium inside the core. The initial conditions used to carry out this analysis are
based on available results derived from codes likeMELCOR calculation code [R. Ganntt, D. Kalinich, J. Cardoni,
J. Phillips, A. Goldmann, S. Pickering, M. Francis, K. Robb, L. Ott, D. Wang, C. Smith, S. St. Germain,
D. Schwieder, S. Phelan, Fukushima Daiichi Accident Study (Status as of April 2012), Sandia Report Sand 2012-
6173, Unlimited Release Printed August, 2012]. The core degradation could then follow different ways: axial
progression of the debris and the molten fuel through the lower support plate; lateral progression of the molten
fuel through the shroud. On the basis of the Bali program results [J.M. Bonnet, An integral model for the
calculation of heat ﬂux distribution in a pool with internal heat generation, in Nureth7 530 Conference Saratoga
Springs, NY, USA, September 10–15, 1995 (1995)] and the TMI-2 accident observations [D.W.Ackers, J.R.Wolf,
Relocation of Fuel Debris to the Lower Head of the TMI2 Reactor Vessel-A possible scenario, TMI 2 pressure
vessel investigation project, in Proceedings of the Open forum OECD/NEA and USNRCm, Boston, USA, 20–22
October 1993 (1993)], this work is focused on the consequences of a lateral melt progression (not excluding an
axial progression through the support plate). Analysis of the events and the associated time sequence will be
detailed. Besides, this analysis identiﬁes a number of issues. Random calculations and statistical analysis of the
results could be performed with calculation codes such as LEONAR–PROCOR codes [R. Le Tellier, L. Saas, F.
Payot, Phenomenological analyses of corium propagation in LWRs: the PROCOR software platform, in
ERMSAR 2015, Marseille, France, 24–26 March, 2015 (2015)].rederic.payot@cea.fr
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which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
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The three accidents (i.e. accidents in Units 1, 2, and 3) led
to different degrees of core damage, with Unit 1 being
probably the most severely damaged of the three [1]. The
ﬁrst conjectures about the Unit 1 core damage assumed a
vessel lower head failure, a core material release into the
containment cavity, and core-concrete interactions likely
initiated. Units 2 and 3 are likely less damaged [2,3].
The description of corium progression events is mainly
carried out by the mechanistic calculation codes. The safety
demonstrations (e.g. AP1000 [4]) using these codes are
usually based on bounding situations because of high
complexity of phenomena. The limitations associated to
bounding situations (e.g. problem of the focusing effect
during the transient formation and steady state situations)
led CEA [5] to develop, together with EDF, an alternative
phenomenological approach (so-called “phenomenological
approach”) in order to supplement the current severe
accident calculation codes [6].
The phenomenological approach developed in order to
describe the corium progression covers the accidental
situations from the core melting propagation down to the
Molten Core Concrete Interaction (MCCI) in LWRs. This
approach was elaborated from physical models and
knowledge concerning the corium behavior, which provides
emerging trends and plausible “best estimate” sequences.
The analysis is complicated by the fact that phenomena are
sometimes unknown and highly coupled at various scales.
Moreover, these corium conﬁgurations in the lower head are
most probably three dimensional, all the more so because
local and non-axisymmetric effects are expected to have
signiﬁcant consequences for the vessel failure and corium
release conditions into the reactor pit.
These last years, “phenomenological approach” studies
were ﬁrst concentrated on the French 1300 MWe PWR,
considering both dry scenarios and the possibility of ﬂooding
of the primary circuit and/or the reactor pit. BWR reactors
were also studied which provided the piece of information to
analyze the in-vessel corium progression scenario in the Unit
1 of Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant.
Such an analysis of the in-vessel melt progression was
carried out for the Unit 1 of the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear
power plant. In the event timeline, the core uncovering
velocity led to the core degradation of the Unit 1. As an
assumption, without additional water injection, the ﬁrst
core degradation events are the control rod liquefaction and
downward relocation of the B4C and stainless steel, and fuel
debris, in the lower core region. Then, the partial fuel
melting could give rise to the appearance of the ﬁrst corium
pool in the centre of the core, as described by the MELCOR
calculation code [2]. From that time, the core degradation
scenario could follow different ways [7] according to the in-
vessel melt progression, i.e.:– axial progression of the debris and the molten fuel
through the lower support plate and/or;– lateral progression of the molten fuel through the shroud.
It is possible that both previous events did occur
sequentially during the accident. In the following, we willdevelop the scenario based on lateral corium ﬂow through
the shroud.
The objective of this paper is to describe the alternative
relocation path taking into account local and non-
axisymmetric effects. Several issues will be addressed such
as the thermal loads on the shroud, the location and time
delay to vessel failure and corium conﬁguration in the lower
head at vessel failure. Besides, this analysis identiﬁes a
number of open issues.
The models which have been derived from this analysis
have recently been implemented in the PROCOR Platform
[6], which is used for LWR reactor calculations. This
calculation tool includes statistical evaluations (probability
of occurrence, impact of uncertainties, and identiﬁcation of
most important parameters).
This work was presented in the frame of the OECD/
NEA/CSNI Benchmark Study of the Accident at the
Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Station (BSAF) project
[8]. During 2012 and 2014 years, the purpose of this project
was both to study, by mean of severe accident codes, the
Fukushimaaccident in the three crippledunits, until six days
from the reactor shut-down and to give information about in
particular the location and composition of core debris.2 Methodology
The initial conditions used to carry out this analysis are
based on partial core melting with an initial corium pool
formed in the core. This core degradation state (e.g.
amount, location, power, of melt corium pool, etc.) is
described by existing codes, as for example, the MAAP and
MELCOR calculation codes. The appearance of the ﬁrst
corium pool is strongly dependent on the kinetics of the core
uncovery. During the Unit 1 damage sequence, available
water levels in the core are not reliable. We will use data
provided by the MELCOR calculation code [2].
Then the phenomenological evaluation is conducted
step by step following the corium relocation path:– in the core region:
 a new situation (compared to computational results) is
carried out which corresponds to the kinetics of themelt
corium growth, to the relocation in the space between
core and shroud and to the ablation of shroud and of the
core support plate. These phenomena depend on the
presence of water, whose late injection conditions are
also not well known;in the vessel lower part:– evolution of the corium masses released into the vessel
lower part, taking into account the occurrence of
several corium ﬂows at various time intervals;
 the formation of debris, the impact of focusing effect,
the variations in the thermal loads and heating up of
the vessel wall are evaluated in the presence of residual
water;
 the time until vessel failure, thermal loads at this time
and failure conditions are also evaluated (location,
mass of corium, etc.) for dry ex-vessel situation.
Fig. 1. MELCOR prediction of water level evolution in the
reactor core and downcomer regions (Unit 1) [2].
Fig. 2. Illustration of the appearance of the ﬁrst corium pool in
the core: ∼4 h after the reactor shutdown.
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In the Unit 1 accident, as with all of the affected reactors,
following the earthquake, the reactor shutdown was
accomplished on March 11, 2011 at 14:46.
According to the MELCOR calculations [2], the loss of
cooling water leads to core uncover ∼2 h 30 after the reactor
shutdown, within a short period of time as shown in
Figure 1. From there, the core is not sufﬁciently cooled and
the cladding and fuel heatup follows. When the core
temperature reaches between 1000 K and 1200 K, cladding
failure is possible. Indeed, the temperature of the Zircaloy
(Zr) cladding can escalate to its melting temperature, which
would cause cladding failure and relocation. The Zr
oxidation reaction, once started, leads to fast escalation
in fuel temperature. Interaction between fuel, cladding and
other structural materials leads to the formation of molten
material at temperatures possibly below the individual
melting points of the respective materials. This molten
material relocates within the core.
In Unit 1, in the absence of adequate core cooling, core
degradation leads to a large mass of debris relocating within
the lower regions of the core and/or settling on the lower
core support plate. Also, molten pools could formwithin the
debris, located in the centre of the core. From theMELCOR
results, the appearance of the ﬁrst liquid corium pool could
occur ∼4 h after the reactor shutdown as illustrated in
Figure 2. At this time, the water level could be located just
above the core support plate.
The kinetics of corium pool growth in a debris bed (see
[5]) is governed by two contributions:– debris melting due to the heat ﬂux at the molten pool
boundaries (linked to power dissipation in the corium
pool (volume power dissipation q ∼0.6 MW/m3);– heating and melting of the debris under the effect of
residual power in the solid debris.
The molten pool tends to propagate radially, due to
heat-ﬂux distribution linked to internal natural convection
[9]. Indeed, the lateral heat ﬂux of a corium pool is aboutone order of magnitude higher than downward heat ﬂux,
which limits the axial propagation rate of the corium pool
(see Appendix A). Axial melt progression rate is, thus,
reduced in comparison with lateral melt progression. In this
situation, the corium pool could be supported, during the
transient melt progression, by the debris bed and solid
relocation in the lower part of the core (Fig. 2). Axial
propagation of melt is mainly controlled by debris heat-up
and corium relocation in the lower part of the core, but the
heat ﬂux from the pool does not contribute signiﬁcantly to
axial progression. Besides, it is important to underline that
the downward melt progression is also limited by corium
freezing and signiﬁcant formation of debris from the
structure degradation in the lower parts of the core (due
to the presence of water and low hydraulic diameter).
Typically, the whole core meltdown process (i.e. ∼120 t
of oxidic corium from fuel and Zircaloy) could take ∼5 h
under dry conditions (after complete core uncovery).
We consider that the corium pool surface was located at
the core center i.e. height equal to ∼2 m from the lower
support plate (Fig. 2). Due to the tendency of the corium
pool to propagate radially, as previously explained, the
molten pool could reach the peripheral sub-assemblies
before the lower part of the core is molten, as illustrated in
Figure 3. When the pool reaches the outer core assemblies,
there is no obstacle for the melt to relocate between the core
and the shroud (∼5 h 40 after the reactor shutdown). A
relocated melt pool can thus form in this space, which we
will call the Core Annulus Pool or CAP (Fig. 4).
The distance between the external core sub-assemblies
and the shroud is azimuthally not uniformly distributed,
but is of the order of ∼0.1 to ∼0.20 m (mean value:
∼0.16 m). A signiﬁcant proportion of core (20–25 t out of
∼120 t) could relocate between the core and the shroud.
The level of corium in this annular space is supposed to
reach the same level as the corium pool level in the core, as
illustrated in Figure 4. The duration of this sequence is
estimated to be ∼40min.
Meanwhile, we assume that the residual water level
reaches the core support plate. In the following section, a
Fig. 3. Illustration of the corium ﬂow in the core annulus pool:
∼5 h 40 after the reactor shutdown.
Fig. 4. Illustration of the shroud failure from the core annulus
pool: ∼6 h 40 after the reactor shutdown.
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support plate, in the vessel lower head region, is assumed.4 Core annulus pool formation
The corium accumulation duration in the CAP could take
∼40 min. During this period, no water is present on the
outside of the shroud. With a small lateral heat ﬂux
towards the shroud (order ofmagnitude1:∼0.03MW/m2;),
the shroud thickness ablated over 40 min is evaluated to be
∼9 mm out of 38 mm. Besides, the downward heat ﬂux
towards the lower support plate is about one order of
magnitude lower that the lateral heat ﬂux. During this1Assuming that half of the dissipated power in the core (q) will be
used to heat the shroud wall: ’:S ¼ q:V =2 with: V and S the
volume and surface of corium annulus zone.40 min period, the support plate failure (50 mm thickness)
is here excluded from the corium relocated in the CAP.
Then, when the corium height in the CAP reaches the
corium pool level in the core (∼6 h 40 after the reactor
shutdown, 40 min after relocation in the CAP), the lateral
heat ﬂux towards the shroud (from corium in the core and
in theCAP) increases to∼0.3 MW/m2. In this situation,we
estimate that the shroud failure could take ∼20 min, as
illustrated in Figure 4.
We estimate that the shroud failure does not occur
before the corium height in the CAP reaches the corium
pool level in the core. We then consider that the shroud fails
locally (hot spot) and that relocation in the outer volume
consequently leads to a 3D conﬁguration of corium. After
shroud failure, the molten corium ﬂows into the Shroud
External Annulus (SEA) (space between shroud and vessel)
which is occupied by the walls of the recirculation jet pumps
and bounded at its lower part by the recirculation jet pump
support plate.
At that time, the corium pools in the CAP and in the
core form a single pool. From lateral heat ﬂux distribution
considerations in themelt pool, we estimate that the corium
mass released from the core region towards the shroud
external annulus (SEA) is estimated to ∼36 t.
The focusing effect (if any, linked to metal layer
stratiﬁcation above oxidic corium in the core pool) is not
expected to have a signiﬁcant impact on the time required
for the transfer of oxidic material to the SEA. Indeed, in the
case of a focusing effect, the metal relocates before the
oxidic melt in the external volume which does almost not
affect the shroud ablation by the oxydic melt.5 Shroud external annulus pool formation
(SEA; jet pump area)
The ∼36 t corium mass released from the core region (i.e.
core and CAP) towards the shroud external annulus zone
(SEA) is expected to occur ∼6 h 40 after the reactor
shutdown.
We furthermore consider that the duration of corium
relocation events is short (a few minutes) in comparison
with the whole melting and pool progression time sequence
(which takes several hours).
It is worth noticing that an ∼13 t water mass could be
initially present in the lower part of the SEA area (around
the lower part of the jet pumps). We consider that water
level is the same level than in the core support plate inside
and outside the lower part of the 20 tubes of the jet pumps.
Water outside the jet pumps can evaporate from the corium
relocation in the SEA which leads to debris formation
around the lower part of the jet pumps. We assume that
water inside the jet pumps is in connection with the water in
the lower head.
The external annulus is bounded at the lower part by
the plates supporting the jet pumps. A direct access to the
lower head is possible either through the jet pumps (20 mm
wall thickness) or through the shroud wall (38 mm
thickness). Nevertheless, this presence of water at high
pressure (near to 70 bars; heat ﬂux ’CHF ∼7.4 MW/m2 at
Fig. 5. Illustration of the corium relocation in the SEA: ∼6 h 40
after the reactor shutdown.
Fig. 6. Zoom of the corium relocation in the SEA: ∼6 h 40 after
the reactor shutdown.
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the wall dry-out.
As illustrated in Figures 5 and 6, corium relocation in
residual water in SEA leads to quenching and residual
water evaporation. Two situations are possible: complete
water evaporation in the SEA or only partial water
evaporation.5.1 Complete water evaporation in the SEA
It would lead to a ∼13 t solid corium mass (like debris)3.
The remaining corium mass would be in liquid/dense form
i.e. ∼23 t. The dense/liquid corium height could be just2The Critical Heat Flux (CHF) varies as a function of vessel
pressure P and enthalpy of water evaporation L, as follow:
’CHF ∼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
P
P 0
⋅ LL0
q
with P0 the standard pressure (1.013 × 10
5 Pa)
and L0 the evaporation enthalpy at 1 bar (2.2 × 10
6 J/kg). At
70 bars, L= 1.5 × 106 J/kg.
If we consider ’CHF ∼1.3MW/m2 at room pressure, ’CHF
∼7.4MW/m2 at 70 bars.
3The solid corium mass (like debris) is evaluated from the quench
potential of residual water on the basis of the evaporation heat.
Here, we assume that water is at saturation temperature and that
vapor is not superheated.located below the level of the jet pump recirculation loop, as
illustrated in Figure 5. Nevertheless, it cannot be excluded
that a small part of liquid corium is released into the jet
pump recirculation loop because of the presence of the
porosity of the solid corium settled in the SEA and because
of 3D effects (local failure of the shroud, local relocation of
corium in the SEA space). The re-melting of solid corium
(e.g. debris) would then take ∼6 h (see [5]). Besides, heat
from the corium pool can be transmitted to the structures
i.e. shroud, jet pumps and vessel:– in the presence of water in the lower head, melting of the
vertical shroud and jet pump wall can be excluded (heat
ﬂux ’CHF ∼7.4 MW/m2 at 70 bars versus ’shroud
∼0.04MW/m2 provided by the corium pool). Also,
regarding the ’CHF and ’shroud, failure by focusing effect
can also be excluded. Besides, regarding the heat ﬂux to
the shroud, ’shroud, the duration to evaporate water to a
level below the support plate in front of the corium pool in
the SEA is very long i.e. ∼10 h;– under vessel external dry conditions, melting of the vessel
wall would take up to ∼10 h. However, if some non-
miscible mass of molten metal relocates on top of the
oxidic phase, a risk of early local vessel failure exists due
to a focusing effect.
5.2 Only partial water evaporation
It is consistent with partial corium quenching and with a
limited solid corium mass (like debris) smaller than 13 t. A
signiﬁcant corium pool/dense layer could then accumulate
from unquenched molten material (>23 t):– for this liquid corium mass higher than 23 t, the excess
corium could potentially be released into the jet pump
recirculation loop, as illustrated in Figure 7;– the remaining water in this area would evaporate at a rate
of ∼0.2 t/min. As long as water is present, the debris re-
melting can be excluded;– under vessel external dry conditions, melting of the vessel
would also take ∼10 h.
6 Second melt relocation from the core
After the ﬁrst corium relocation from the core region (core
and CAP), we estimate that ∼40 min are necessary to
continue to propagate the pool in the core before next
corium ﬂow through the shroud. But 3D effects may also
play a role (e.g., local shroud continuous melting and
continuous 3D ﬂow).
The follow-on coriummass released from the core region
is evaluated to be ∼30 t (∼7 h 20 after the reactor shutdown
namely ∼40 min after the ﬁrst corium ﬂow, as depicted in
Figure 7). Given the presence of liquid/solid corium in the
SEA (water can be considered to be evaporated from SEA
at this time), we point out that the second corium ﬂow from
the core is released into the two recirculation loops of the jet
pumps. The recirculation loop dimensions are signiﬁcant
Fig. 7. Illustration of the secondary shroud failure from the core
annulus pool: ∼7 h 20 after the reactor shutdown.
Fig. 8. Illustration of the last corium relocation from the core:
∼8 h 50 after the reactor shutdown.
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which could accumulate a corium mass up to 60 t. Also, it
can be assumed that water was present in these pipes. The
water mass in the recirculation loops is estimated to be
∼15 t. The delay time corresponding:– to debris quenching (down to ∼800 K);
– to the residual water evaporation;
– to the increase of debris and circuit steel temperatures up
to 1700 K (steel melting temperature);
is ∼4 h at 70 bars (see Appendix B). So, we cannot exclude a
failure of the recirculating pipes ∼4 h after corium
relocation in these pipes. Thus, a recirculation pipe failure
could occur at ∼11 h 20 after the reactor shutdown. This is
consistent with the decrease of the RPV pressure observed
before ∼12 h [2].
Then, the corium from the water recirculation pipe of
the jet pumps could be released into the dry well on the
basemat, outside the pedestal space, as illustrated in
Figure 9.7 Following melt relocation from the core
and corium release on the basemat
After these events, ∼90 min would be further necessary to
melt the rest of the core under adiabatic conditions. Two
situations are emphasized. The ﬁrst one assumes a ﬂow of
residual corium through the core support plate. The second
situation corresponds to additional corium relocation
through the shroud. Our analysis gives the preference to
the second situation because the heat ﬂux to the support
plate (∼0.01 MW/m2, Ref. [9]) is estimated to be much less
than the lateral heat ﬂux (0.4 MW/m2).
It is worth noticing that a thermal failure of
instrumentation tubes or guide tubes which are in contact
with corium debris or a corium pool (during re-melting of
corium) inside the core could plausibly precede core support
plate failure. As a conclusion, the tube failure through the
core support plate cannot be excluded which would lead to
relocating a part of corium from the core.
Nevertheless, the lateral relocation (through the
shroud) is the conjecture privileged in our scenario analysis.
Some part of the remaining corium mass in the core region
(∼54 t) could potentially relocate to the SEA,∼9 h after the
reactor shutdown.
As regards the corium pool in the core, the lower and
upper crust thicknesses are evaluated to be ∼8 cm and
∼4 cm, respectively. These crust thicknesses correspond to
∼10 t of solid corium out of 54 t in the core, as illustrated in
Figure 8. The liquid corium part (i.e. 44 t) could ﬂow from
the core in the water recirculation loop of the jet pumps (via
the SEA). The corium part in crust form is assumed to
remain in the core.
Following the failure of the water recirculation loop of
the jet pumps (∼11 h 20 after the reactor shutdown), we
consider that a part of ∼90 t of corium can be relocated on
the dry well basemat, as shown in Figure 9. From there, it
should be necessary to study the MCCI outside the pedestal
space.
Fig. 9. Illustration of the jet pump recirculation failure from
liquid corium settled inside: ∼11 h 20 after the reactor shutdown.
Fig. A.1 The lateral local heat flux distribution for a oxide
corium pool from BALI experiments.
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This study presents an analysis of the in-vessel melt
progression in the Unit 1 of the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear
power plant. Not excluding axial melt progression and core
support plate failure, this work focuses on the sequence
based on a lateral progression of the molten fuel. The
corium could potentially ﬂow through the shroud well
before axial draining through the support plate. This
scenario leads to the corium accumulation in the core
periphery and, from there, in the shroud external annulus,
with the jet pumps, before potentially penetrating in the jet
pump recirculation loops.
The lateral progression of the molten fuel assumed in
this study have been carried out relying on major
measurements in the plant during the accident, such as
core water level, RPV pressure and PCV pressure. Due to
uncertainties caused by the limited information including
measurements and physical comprehension, several acci-
dent scenarios can reproduce relatively well the measured
values. In the frame of the BSAF project, the lateral
progression of the molten fuel through the shroud was also
predicted by two participants releasing corium in the lateral
lower part of the vessel. The other participants predict an
axial draining through the support plate.Appendix A
The analytic expressions for lateral local heat ﬂux
distribution (’) were obtained from BALI results [9] which
were qualiﬁed for turbulent boundary layer regime and top
cooled cavity, in 3D geometry (hemisphere), as written
hereafter:
’
’max ¼ sin uð Þ
1
3
1cos uð Þ
kH
R
 4
3=

for u< arcos(1-kH/R)
’
’max ¼ sin uð Þ
1
3= for arcos (1-kH/R)< u< arcos(1-H/R)with k= 0.60 and 0.70 for H/R= 0.25 and 1.0, respectively
with R, H and u the radius, the height and the local
inclination of the corium pool.
The lateral local heat ﬂux distribution is presented just
below.Appendix B: Corium relocation in a steel pipe
in the presence of water
Objective: evaluation of the failure time of a steel pipe when
corium is release inside in the presence of water
Analysis: the corium transfer in a pipe in the presence
of water can be described by an energy balance as
followed:
Mcorium Lf þ Cp T i  T f
  þMcorium⋅qvol
rcorium
⋅t ¼
Mwater⋅Lwater þM steel⋅ Cp Tmeltingsteel  Tf
  þ
Mcorium⋅ Cp Tmeltingsteel  Tf
  þ ’lost⋅t⋅Spipe
with
Mcorium the corium mass in the pipe
Msteel the steel mass of the pipe
Lf latent melting heat of corium
(2.8 × 105 J/kg)
Cp speciﬁc heat (517 J/kg/K for corium and
600 J/kg/K for steel)
Tf debris temperature (800 K)
Ti initial temperature (2800 K)
Tmelting_steel steel melting temperature (1700 K)
qvol the volumetric core power dissipation
(i.e.0.55 MW/m3 for the Unit 1)
t the failure characteristic time
Mwater the water mass
Lwater the water evaporation heat (1.5 × 10
6 J/kg
at 70 bars)’lost the lost heat ﬂux
Spipe the pipe section
8 F. Payot and J.-M. Seiler: EPJ Nuclear Sci. Technol. 1, 7 (2015)As presented in themain text, it can be assumed that 30 t
of corium are released in two steel pipes with a 0.58m
diameter (and a 16m length) ﬁlled with 15 t water. By
neglecting the lost energy (i.e. the last term), the steel failure
time can be evaluated i.e. ∼10 h.References
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